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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature o[the Case 
The Schneider's appeal from the Memorandum Decision and Order entered by District Court 
Judge Bradbury on June 23, 2009 in which the District Judge granted the Kennedy's claim of 
adverse possession. Additionally, Schneider's appeal the District Court's Decision Memorandum 
entered on August 28, 2009 whereby the trial court awarded attorneys fees to the Kennedy'S. 
Statement ofthe Facts 
For generations, both the Kennedy family and the Schneider family have owned certain 
property located near the village of Stites, Idaho, in Idaho County. The Idaho County tax records 
identifY each party's property as follows: 
Samuel E Schneider Jr. Vernon & Dorothy Kennedy 
T32N, R4E, SEC 20 60.03 AC T32N R4E SEC 2015.066 AC 
SE4NE4 & NE4SE4 LESS Tax # TAX #'S 16,28 & 30 ALONG 
16,17,18,20,21,80 WITH A 50' WIDE STRIP 
81,85 OF RR ROW ALONG W SIDE OF 
TAX #28 LESS TAX #'S 113, 
220, 236, 268 & 269 
Def. Exhibit E See PI. Exhibit 201 See also PI. Ex. 5 
These properties at issue are visually depicted within PI. Exhibit 24A with the Schneider 
IThe 1999 tax record is the same except it does not include the language "with a 50' wide 
strip of RR Row along w side of' See Plaintiff s Exhibit 23. 
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property highlighted in yellow. The property subject to the Kennedy's adverse possession claim is 
the highlighted property located west of the river and adjacent to T-16 and T-30. For clarity sake, 
Tax lots 16 and 30 are more clearly shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit 24. 
PI. Exhibit 24A 
h 
u-. -. I , 
t 
I . . 
2842 LUKt:S ULCH 
1 T·16 
PI. Exhibit 24 
\ 
Although Idaho County records identify certain properties by tax lot numbers, the legal 
descriptions for those tax lots are contained within metes and bounds descriptions. The legal 
description of the Schneider property is defined within a 1953 deed and describes the property as 
follows: 
The Southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter and the Northeast quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 20, Twp 32 N. R. 4E. B.M., excepting therefrom the 
property described in those certain conveyances recorded in the records ofthe office 
of the recorder ofIdaho County, Idaho, in the Books of Deeds, and at the respective 
pages thereof as follows: Book 23 at page 371, Book 26 at pages 49 and 623, Book 
27 at page 499, Book 32 at page 69 aud Book 34 page 525. 
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(Defendant's Exhibit I C) Each Book of Deeds referenced, includes a metes and bounds description 
which correspond to a specific tax lot number within the Idaho County Assessor's records. Thus, 
the six exempted properties identified within the 1953 deed match the descriptions ofIdaho County 
tax lot numbers 16, 18,20,80,81 and 85. For example, the property description identified in Book 
26 at page 49 is identical to the Idaho County Assessors Office legal description for tax lot number 
16. (See page 3 of Defendant's Exhibit IK and Defendant's Exhibit D.) Furthermore, these legal 
descriptions for tax lot 16 are identical to the legal description contained within the 1924 Deed which 
Kennedy relies upon in its claim of adverse possession under written claim of title. (See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit II) For convenience sake, the property dvscriptions contained within each record are as ,'. 
follows: 
Book 26 at Page 49 Assessor's Tax Records 1924 Deed 
(Defendant's Exhibit ID, p. 3) (Defendant's Exhibit D) (Plaintiff s Exhibit II) 
Begiuning at a point 34.5 feet Tract beginning at a point 34.5 Beginning at a point 34.5 feet 
North and 50 feet East of the feet Nand 50 feet E of the SW north and 50 feet east of the 
S.W. Comer of the S.E. 114 of corner of SE 1/4 of NEII4, south-west comer of the SE 
the N.E. 114 of Sec. 20 Twp 32 Sec. 20, Twp. 32 N. R4E B.M; 114 NE 1/4 of Sec. 20, Twp. 
N. R. 4E B.M., and running thence N. 29° E 522 chains; 32 N. Range 4E. B.M., and 
thence North 29° East 5.22 thence N 18° 45' E. 1.85 running thence north 29 ° east 
chains; thence N. 18° 45' East chains; thence N. 8° 30' E. 5.22 chains; thence N. 18° 45' 
1.83 chains; thence North 8 ° 2.90 chains; thence W. 3.53 East 1.83 chains; thence North 
30' E. 2.90 chains; thence chains; thence S. 9.13 chains 8° 30' East 2.9 chains; thence 
West 3.53 chains; thence to the place of beginning west 3.53 chains; thence south 
South 9.13 chains to the point containing 3.42 acres. 9.13 chains to point of 
of beginning. beginning. 
With regard to the Kennedy's property, at issue, the tax lot number specified within the 
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tax assessment notice correspond to certain metes and bound descriptions contained within the 
Idaho County Assessors records. See Defendant's Exhibit D. As noted above, the legal 
description for tax lot 16 is identical to the legal description contained within the 1924 deed of 
conveyance. 
The parties tax assessments are based upon the tax lot numbers and corresponding 
property descriptions. Thus, any tax payments made by the Kennedy's were for the property 
described in their tax records which does not include the disputed property. 
Course of Proceedings 
The Kennedy's filed their Complaint on July 11, 2007. (R. 1-11). The Schneider's filed 
their Answer on September 25, 2007. A bench trial was held on April 17 , 2009 before the Honorable 
Judge Bradbury. At the conclusion of the trial, Kennedy and Scheider submitted written closing 
arguments. (See R. 69) The District Judge issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on June 23, 
2009 in which the District Judge found in favor of Kennedy. Kennedy sought an award of attorney 
fees and costs. Schneider objected and filed Defendants Schneider's Motion to Disallow Attorney's 
Fees on July 23, 2009. A hearing was held on July 30,2009. The District Judge entered its Order 
Approving Cost Bill and Judgment Against Defendant Samuel E. Schneider on August 6, 2009 and 
filed its corresponding Decision and Memorandum regarding the award of attorney fees on August 
28,2009. 
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The Schneiders' appeal from the District Court's granting of Kennedy's adverse possession 
claim as well as the District Court's award of attorney fees to the Kennedy's. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court commit error in granting Kennedy's claims of adverse possession 
against Schneider when the Kennedys failed to prove that they paid property taxes on the 
land they sought to adversely possess? 




I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANTING OF THE KENNEDY'S ADVERSE 
POSSESSION CLAIM WAS IN ERROR SINCE THE KENNEDY'S FAILED TO 
PROVE THAT THEY PAID TAXES ON THE PROPERTY AT ISSUE FOR THE 
REQUISITE TIME PERIOD. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The relevant standard of review for claims of adverse possession was outlined in the holding 
in Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 269-270,127 P3d 167, 172-173 (2005). In Luce, the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated, "On appeal, this Court will not set aide findings off act, unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Marshall v. Lair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975,979 (1997) (citing I.R.C.P. Rule 
52(a) ). If a district court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent, though 
conflicting, evidence, this Court will not disturb the findings. Hodgins v.Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 
76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). In contrast, this Court exercises free review over the district court's 
conclusions of law to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law and whether 
the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 269, 985 
P.2d 1127, 1131 (1999)." 
B. The Payment of Taxes on the Disputed Property is a Required Element of any Adverse 
Possession Claim. 
The Kennedy's initial Complaint sought a claim of adverse possession under oral claim of 
right, claiming that for more than twenty years, they had adversely possessed the property at issue 
and paid all real property taxes assessed against the property. (R. 1-11 ) The required elements 
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proving a claim for adverse possession are well established in Idaho. As noted by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264 (2005): 
Oral claims for adverse possession are governed by Idaho Code § 5-210. This section 
requires that the land being claimed have been enclosed or that the land being 
claimed be cultivated or improved, that the possession be for a period of five years 
and that the adverse possessor pay all taxes levied and assessed on the land. The 
party claiming adverse possession must prove all of the essential elements of 
adverse possession by clear and satisfactory evidence. Roarkv. Bentley, 139 Idaho 
793,796,86 P.3d 507,510 (2004). In addition to the requirements ofI.C. § 5-210, 
this includes that the possession has been actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous 
and hostile to the party against whom the claim is made. Winn v. Eaton, 128 Idaho 
670,673,917 P.2d 1310,1313 (Ct. App.l996) (citing Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 
65,67-68,813 P.2d 876, 878-79 (1991». 
Luce, 142 Idaho at 273. (Emphasis added) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Kennedy's sought to amend the pleadings to include a claim 
of adverse possession under written claim oftitle. (Tr. P. 234 Ls. 2-8) The amendment was based 
upon the Kennedy's erroneous belief that such a claim would eliminate the need for them to prove 
the tax payment element. (Tr. P. 234 Ls. 5-8). Contrary to the Kennedy's understanding of the law, 
the Idaho Supreme Court has determined that the payment of taxes is a required element under all 
theories of adverse possession. Rice v. Hill City Stockyards Company, 121 Idaho 576, 826 P.2d 1288 
(1991); Pincock v. Pocatello Gold & Copper Min. Co., 100 Idaho 325, 331, 597 P.2d 211 (1979). 
The District Court properly followed this well-settled law, stating that the tax payment requirement 
of Idaho Code Section 5-210 is also required on claims arising under Idaho Code Section 5-207. 
(Memorandum Decision and Order, R. 24). The fact that the Kennedy's sought to amend their 
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complaint to include a claim they believed avoided the need for proving payment of taxes evidences 
the fact that even the Kennedys did not believe they could satisfy their burden of proof on this issue. 
C. The District Court's Findings of Fact Are Unsupported by the Record and Are Clearly 
Erroneous. 
The key dispute at trial was whether or not the Kennedy's satisfied the requirement of paying 
taxes on the disputed property. The District Court was unequivocal in its findings that the tax 
payment element had been satisfied. The Court's findings; however, are based upon its erroneous 
understanding of the testimony of Ms. Carolynn Park, an employee of the Idaho County Assessor's 
Office. The District Court's understanding of Ms. Park's testimony, as well as its reliance upon that 
understanding, is captured in its Memorandum Decision and Order. The court stated: 
Carolynn Park works in the mapping department for the Idaho County Assessor. She 
testified that tax payers pay by the tax number assigned to property by assessor. She 
stated that the disputed property was included in both tax numbers. She testified that 
the number of acres for which the Kennedys were taxed, that the disputed property 
had to have been included in their tax parcel. The evidence is clear and convincing 
that both the Kennedys and the Schneider family have paid taxes on the disputed 
property for more than twenty years. 
(R. P. 20-21). The District Court reiterated its understanding of Ms. Park's testimony within its 
Decision Memorandum wherein the Court stated: 
Also uncontested and irrefutable was the Idaho County Assessor's Mapper, Carolynn 
Park, who testified that both the Kennedys and Mr. Schneider had been assessed and 
taxed for the disputed property. Given the number of acres for which Mr. Kennedy 
was taxed, she testified, the assessment had to include the disputed property. There 
was no evidence to the contrary. 
(R.61). Contrary to the District Court's findings, Ms. Park did not testify that the Kennedy's and 
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Schneider's were paying taxes on the same property. Instead, she actually denied such a concept and 
stated that each party's payment of taxes was only upon the property identified within their tax bill. 
During her testimony, Ms. Park testified that she utilized the property descriptions for 
property owned by the Kennedy's as well as the Schneider's and determined that tax records 
overstated the land owned by both parties. Specifically, Ms. Park testified that she recalculated the 
acreage for the Schneider property, which was being assessed at 60.03 acres, and determined it was 
actually 46.864 acres. (Tr. P. 102, Ls. 5-11). Likewise, she recalculated the Kennedy property, 
which was assessed at 15.066 acres, and determined that it was actuallyl4.588 acres. (Tr. P. 103, 
L. 13 - P. 104, L. 20) The recalculation was based upon use of the metes and bounds descriptions 
assigned to each tax lots. (Tr. P. 113 L. 23 - P. 114, L. 17) Although far from the model of clarity, 
Ms. Park's testimony contradicts the court's findings and establishes that, in her opinion, each party 
paid taxes only upon the property described in the tax records. (Tr. P. 121, Ls. 2-18) 
A. I don't believe I said he [Kennedy] was paying taxes on that area. He was paying taxes 
on Tax 16 and his other tax numbers. 
Q. Okay. Which would be Tax 28? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But--
A. And 30. 
Q ..... So, when you're saying he's [Kennedy's] paying taxes on-all you know is he's 
paying taxes on Tax Lot 16, Tax Lot 28, and the other tax parcels that are identified on 
the --
A. On the tax bill, yes, yes. 
Q. Tax bill, okay. And the same would go for the Schneiders, the taxes that you were 
aware that were paid, all you know is if they're paid ... as identified on the tax bill? 
A. Yes 
(Tr. P. 121, Ls. 2-18) 
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Ms. Park's opinion that the party's did not pay taxes on the same property is best captured 
in the maps she created which specifically identifies the land each party is paying taxes upon. (See 






Kennedy Property (Def. Ex. C) Schneider Property (Def. Ex. B) 
None of the highlighted areas overlap, thus, Ms. Park clearly did not have the opinion that 
both the Kennedy's and the Schneider's paid taxes on the same property. Thus, the District Court's 
Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous. 
Mr. Kennedy did testifY at trial that he paid taxes when billed but he only provided tax bills 
for 19992, 20063 and 20084• Such sporadic payments, however, cannot satisfY his requirement of 
proving by clear and convincing evidence that he paid taxes on the dispnted property for twenty 
2Plaintiff s Exhibit 23 
3Plaintiff s Exhibit 19 
4Plaintiff s Exhibit 18 
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years. Moreover, even if he presented evidence of paying every tax bill for the entire twenty years, 
such testimony still would not satisfy the tax payment requirement. To satisfy their burden of proof, 
the Kennedy's would have to prove they paid taxes on the property in dispute. The tax bills specify 
the property for which the taxes are applied. Thus, at most, the Kennedy's tax payments were for 
tax lots 28,30 and 16 only and not the property in dispute. Accordingly, the District Court's findings 
that the Kennedy's had satisfied the tax payment requirement is not supported by the record. 
Although not mentioned in its June 23, 2009 Memorandum Decision and Order, the District 
Court later mentioned in an August 28, 2009 Decision Memorandum concerning attorney fees that 
the Kennedy's had satisfied the tax payment requirement since the acreage occupied by the 
Kennedy'S was the same amount ofland upon which the Kennedy'S were taxed. (R. P. 61) More 
specifically, the District Court states: 
Also uncontested and irrefutable was the Idaho County Assessor's Mapper, Carolyn 
Park, who testified that both the Kennedy's and Mr. Schneider had been assessed and 
taxed for the disputed property. Given the number of acres for which Mr. Kennedy 
was taxed, she testified, the assessment had to include the disputed property. There 
was no evidence to the contrary. That was confirmed by licensed surveyor Elaine 
Pearsons who testified that the Kennedy home place, identified as tax lot number 28 
has 8.18 acres; that tax lot number has 2.01 acres; that the Kennedy portion of tax 
lot number 195 was 56/59 acres and that the disputed property is 4.04 acres for a total 
acreage of 14.79 acres. The Assessors Office taxed the Kennedy'S for 15.06 acres. 
Deducting the railroad right-of-way from the taxed acreage, the remaining acreage 
necessarily includes the 4.04 acres in dispute. "[T]he tax payment requirement will 
be satisfied if the adverse possessor occupies and claims the same amount of land 
5Within their complaint, the Kennedy's sought a claim of adverse possession against Fred 
Stuart for a section of tax lot number 19. Mr. Stuart never appeared or defended the matter and 
default judgment was entered. 
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upon which he was taxes." Wilson, 140 Idaho at 86S. 
(R. P. 61) As discussed above, the Court misstates the testimony of Carolyn Park and, thus, her 
testimony, as defined by the court, was not uncontested and irrefutable. Additionally, the Court's 
findings concerning the acreage the Kennedy's occupied and were taxed is incorrect such that the 
holding in Wilson v. Gladish, 140 Idaho 861, 103 P.3d 474 (200S) is not applicable. 
At trial, Ms. Park testified that she had recalculated the total acreage for which the Kennedys 
were being assessed for taxes by use of the relevant metes and bounds descriptions. Her 
recalculation reduced the acreage assessed from IS.066 acres to 13.S21 acres. (See page 4 of 
Defendant's Exhibit C) In recalculating the acreage, she used the 2009 legal description. The legal 
description defines the Kennedy property as follows: 
T32N R4E SEC 20 13.S21 AC6 
TAX #'s 16,28, & 30 ALONG 
WITH A SO' WIDE STRIP 
OF RR ROW ALONG W SIDE OF 
TAX #28 LESS TAX #'s 113, 
220,236 & PTN 291. 
(See Page 4 of Defendant's Exhibit "D"). 
In computing the calculations, she specifies the acreage for each tax lot number identified, 
as follows: T-16 - 2.0SAC; T-28 -12.00 AC; T-30- .23SAC; SO' STRIP - .316 AC (SO x 27S). The 
total acreage of these lots is 14.566 acres. However, she reduces that amount by the total acreage 
6Ms. Park's struck the IS.066 acres and wrote in 13.521 acres. 
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for Tax lots 113, 220,236 and 291 which she calculated as 1.045 acres. Thus, the total acreage she 
assigned to the Kennedy property is 13.521 acres. For completeness sake, it should be noted that she 
assigned thefollowing acreage to the exempted lots: T-l13 - .284; T-220 - .170; T-236 - .285; PTN 
T-291 - .306. 
The relevant legal descriptions for all of the Kennedy property is contained in Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 5 which is a quitclaim deed in which Mr. Kennedy deeded the above property to his wife. 
Attached to the quitclaim deed is Idaho County's tax lot numbers and corresponding legal 
descriptions. Each description specifies the total acreage for that lot number. A review of those 
numbers matches the numbers used by Ms. Park, except for tax lot 16. With tax lot 16, the specified 
acreage is 3.42 acres. This acreage was reduced when a flood shifted the course of the South Fork 
of the Clearwater River. As noted by both Ms. Park and Ms. Pearsons, the surveyed acreage for lot 
16 is now 2.015 Acres. 
The Court's calculation of actual acreage is simply incorrect. To achieve its finding that the 
acreage used is the same as the acreage occupied, the court improperly reduced the acreage of tax 
lot 28 by approximately 4 acres which happened to be the sum of acres comprising the disputed 
property. Specifically, the Court identified the acreage for tax lot 28 as being 8.1 acres (R. 61). 
The legal description for tax lot 28; however, identifies that parcel as being 12 acres. (See page 3 
of Plaintiff's Exhibit 5) Tax lot 28 is described as follows: 
All that portion of Nez Perce Allotment No. 1668 that is situated on the East side 
of the Northern Pacific Railroad Right of way in the NW1/4 of the NE 114 of 
-13-
Section 20. Township 32.N.R. 4 East. B.M., containing (12) acres more or less ... 
(Page. 3, Plaintiffs Exhibit 5. (emphasis added.» The Court's reduction of tax lot 28's acreage 
contradicts both the legal description as well as the amount Carolynn Park assigned to that parcel 
when she calculated the acreage included within the Kennedy's tax bill. 
Further evidencing the District Court's mistaken understanding, as to the evidence presented 
at trial, was its claim that a certain parcel ofland known as the slaughterhouse property was included 
within the confines of tax lot 16. During the trial, there was testimony discussing the location of tax 
lot 30 which was known as the slaughter house property due to the fact that at one time a slaughter 
house was situated on that parcel ofland. Within its Memorandum Decision and Order, the District 
Court discussed the slaughter house property, stating, "The slaughter houses land was wrongly 
configured to lay perpendicular to the South fork of the Clearwater River (South Fork) instead of 
parallel." ( R. 16). The court then states "The slaughter house property that the Manes reserved 
consisted of 2.0 1 acres and was taxed as tax number 16 ... " (R. 17) The testimony elicited at trial 
by the Kennedy's; however, established that the slaughter house property is identified as tax lot 30 
and not tax lot 16. More particularly, the Kennedy's presented the testimony of Elaine Pearsons, a 
land surveyor, who presented testimony concerning the location of the slaughterhouse property. (Tr. 
P. 11, Ls. 12-23; P. 27, 1. 11 - P. 28, 1. 8) With regard to tax lot 30, Ms. Pearsons provided the 
following testimony: 
Q. Call to your attention Exhibit No. 24, and there's -on Exhibit No. 24 there is some 
yellow coloring, is there not? 
-14-
A. Yes. 
Q. And there is a T30 downriver from Tax 16, is there not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know what T30 was intended to be? 
A. The slaughterhouse. 
Q. Does that run perpendicular or parallel to the river based on tax-or Exhibit No. 24? 
A. It runs paralJel to the river. 
Q. And that's contrary to what Exhibit No. 11 shows? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does Tax 30 in your research ultimately turn out to be the slaughterhouse property? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. P. 27, 1. 16 - P. 28, 1. 8) (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the Court's determination that the 
slaughter house property was included within tax lot 16 is not supported by the record and is clearly 
erroneous and demonstrates the Court's misunderstanding as what evidence was actually presented 
at trial. 
D. The District Court's Reliance upon the Testimony of Leah Mager is Misplaced. 
At trial, Leah Mager, an Idaho County Assessor's Appraiser, presented testimony as to her 
understanding of what property was included within the Kennedy'S tax assessment. During her 
tenure with the Assessor's Office she visited the Kennedy property in 2003 as part of the appraisal 
process and assumed the land at issue was owned by the Kennedy'S and included that property in her 
tax assessment. Based upon this finding, the District Court deemed the tax payment requirement to 
be satisfied. The court stated: 
The uncontested and irrefutable testimony of Leah Mager, the Idaho County 
Assessor's Appraiser, was that she walked the disputed property, inspected it for 
-15-
appraisal purposes, assumed that property was the Kennedy's because they had 
always possessed it and she included the appraised value in the Kennedy's tax 
assessment, which they paid. That that process constituted payment of taxes pursuant 
to Idaho Code section 5-210 because the issue is not if the adverse possessor listed 
in the assessor's office as the taxpayer but taking "the assessor's actual basis for 
valuation of the disputed property. Trappett, 102 Idaho at 530." 
(R.60-61) The court's analysis is erroneous. 
At trial, Ms. Mager established that she had been an appraiser for Idaho County for five years. 
(Tr. P. 132 Ls. 6-8) She went to Kennedy's property in 2003 to do the appraisal and for purposes of 
updating files. (Tr. P. 133, Ls. 8-11). She testified that in her review of the appraisal, she presumed 
that the land in dispute was part of the Kennedy property. (Tr. P. 136, Ls. 4-14) However, upon 
cross examination, Ms. Mager admitted that when she performed the appraisal, she did not calculate 
the acreage of the property. (Tr. P. 140 Ls. 4-5). Ms. Mager did state that she believed her tax 
appraisal increased in value; however, she admitted that her appraisal was based upon the legal 
description within the file and that the increase in value was not based upon a change in acreage but, 
instead, was merely reflecting a change in the market. (Tr. P. 140, L. 2 - P. 141, L. 10). Since Ms. 
Mager only conducted a single appraisal and did not expand upon the area included within the 
appraisal, her impression of what property was included within the land appraised cannot possibly 
be translated into a finding that the Kennedy's satisfied their tax payments. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE 
KENNEDY'S ATTORNEY FEES. 
The District Court granted an award of attorney fees to the Kennedy's based upon the Court's 
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determination that the Schneider's defense ofthe case was defended frivolously, unreasonably and 
without foundation. For an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-121 to be appropriate, a 
party's "entire defense of [the 1 action would have to have been frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation." Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006). 
Based upon the above-discussion of the District Court's erroneous findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the Schneider's defense was clearly not frivolous, unreasonable or without 
foundation. Instead, the defenses had merit and were well founded in law and fact. Moreover, the 
defenses presented should have resulted in the Schneider's being the prevailing party. Accordingly, 
the District Court's award of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion and should be overturned on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Appellants respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
District Court's granting of the Respondent's claim of adverse possession as well as the District 
Court's award of attorney fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~ day of January, 2010. 
CLARK and FEENEY 
~ !9 an D. Hally, a Member of the firm 
,/' Attorneys for Appellants Schneider 
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